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Abstract 
This thesis will explore three major areas of political science research: The timing 
of elections, Duverger' s law and voter turnout. Each of these topics has been covered 
extensively in the literature. However, as with most areas of political science, there 
remain facets of each of these topics that deserve further examination. Chapter 1 begins 
this discussion with an introduction to each of these three topics and a description of the 
Canadian electoral and party systems. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of the timing of elections on the government party 
in Canadian parliamentary elections. This chapter shows that there are aspects of the 
study of election timing in presidential regimes that also pertain to the study of election 
timing in parliamentary regimes. In particular, this chapter finds that the "honeymoon 
period" described by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (1995) for presidential 
regimes relates to early election calls by the government in parliamentary regimes. The 
issues of sample size and susceptibility to operationalization limit the explanatory power 
of the analysis in this chapter. While these results show that future research in this area is 
warranted, these problems must be addressed in order to enhance these initial findings. 
Du verger's law states that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the 
two-party system" (1964, 217). An important implication of the law is that the electoral 
system is a significant determinant of the number of parties. Chapter 3 shows that even 
when multi-partism appears at the national level, the district level can present a different 
picture depending on how the number of parties is counted. This number of competitive 
parties is determined by using the same LT index method as Gaines (1999). Using this 
vote share method, the results for the 1997 and the 2000 election confirm the pattern 
established by Gaines for the elections from 1935 through 1993. By using seat shares 
instead of vote shares in the LT index, I find that Canadian elections at the riding level 
are more appropriately characterized as two-party or even one-party competition. This 
finding, which is the most significant contribution of this chapter, concurs with 
Duverger's (1964) hypothesis that Canadian exceptionalism at the national level is the 
result of different regional parties competing with national parties in different regions of 
the country. 
There are two main methods that are used to study voter turnout. Single country 
studies, particularly in the case of the U.S., tend to focus on socioeconomic and 
behavioral variables while comparative studies tend to favor an analysis of institutional 
variables. In Chapter 4, I present an analysis of voter turnout using a combination of the 
two approaches. Chapter 4 presents a longitudinal analysis of Canadian turnout using the 
institutional variables explored in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as a snapshot analysis of the 
1997 Canadian election. I use regional analysis to demonstrate the problem with using an 
aggregate analysis to explain a phenomenon that is affected by different variables in 
different regions. This analysis shows that different independent variables have a 
distinctly different effect on voter turnout in different regions. When combined in an 
aggregate analysis, these independent variables lose some of their explanatory power 
because of the contradictory effects observed in different regions. 
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Chapter 1 
Canada: The Electoral System and Political Parties 
Introduction 
Within the voting behavior and the party development literature, there is a vast 
array of approaches and methods used to analyze the relationship of voting, parties and 
the electoral system. One of the major divisions in these literatures is between a 
behavioral and an institutional approach. While this thesis combines the two approaches 
in the analysis of voter turnout, the thesis is largely based on an institutional approach 
focusing on the impact that electoral system design and its consequences have on the 
development of the party system and government formation. 
This thesis will explore three major areas of political science research: The timing 
of elections, Du verger's law and voter turnout. Each of these topics has been covered 
extensively in the literature. However, as with most areas of political science, there 
remain facets of each of these topics that deserve further examination. There is also a 
substantial amount of interconnectedness between these areas as they relate to party 
development and voting behavior which is one of the major focuses of this work. 
The largest body of work regarding the impact that the timing of elections has on 
government formation has focussed on presidential regimes and the effect of concurrent 
versus non-concurrent elections (Scheve and Tomz 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992; 
Shugart 1995). The parliamentary literature relating to election timing focuses on the use 
of no confidence votes or the policy making decisions of governments rather than the 
effect that election timing has on the electoral fortunes of parties (Huber 1996; Huber and 
McCarty 2001; Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999). There are institutional differences 
between presidentialism and parliamentarism that can account for some of the divergence 
in the research involving election timing. In a parliamentary regime, executive and 
legislative elections are always simultaneous while in a presidential regime that is not 
necessarily the case due to the separate nature of the two branches. Chapter 2 shows that 
there are aspects of the study of election timing in presidential regimes that also pertain to 
the study of election timing in parliamentary regimes. In particular, this chapter finds 
that the "honeymoon period" described by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (1995) 
for presidential regimes relates to early election calls by the government in parliamentary 
regimes. 
Chapter 3 focuses on Duverger's law which has been the subject of a large body 
of literature. Du verger's law states that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours 
the two-party system" (1964, 217). An important implication of the law is that the 
electoral system is a significant determinant of the number of parties. The explanation 
put forth by Duverger for countries that appeared to be exceptions was that while 
multipartism may exist at the national level, it is the result of two-party competition at the 
district level with different parties receiving support in different regions. Chapter 3 
shows that even when multipartism appears at the national level, the district level can 
present a different picture depending on how the number of parties is counted. The 
generally accepted method for counting parties in political science is the LT index 
(described in detail in Chapter 3 and the Appendix). The problem with this index 
involves choosing which measure to use in the calculation. While most scholars use vote 
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shares, I demonstrate that using shares of seats won generates a significantly different 
result and may be a more appropriate method for counting parties. 
There are two main methods that are used to study voter turnout. Single country 
studies, particularly in the case of the U.S., tend to focus on socioeconomic and 
behavioral variables while comparative studies tend to favor an analysis of institutional 
variables. In Chapter 4, I present an analysis of voter turnout using a combination of the 
two approaches. Both the time between elections which was the independent variable in 
Chapter 2 and the number of competitive parties which was the dependent variable in 
Chapter 3 are used as independent variables in the voter turnout analysis. 
While each of these three chapters has a national level analysis at their core, there 
is also a strong regional component involved in Chapters 3 and 4. In the case of Chapter 
3, a regional analysis is used to develop a response to Duverger's contention that 
regionalism is the explanation for Canadian exceptionalism. In Chapter 4, I use regional 
analysis to demonstrate the problem with using an aggregate analysis to explain a 
phenomenon that is affected by different variables in different regions. This analysis 
shows that different independent variables have a distinctly different effect on voter 
turnout in different regions. When combined in an aggregate analysis, these independent 
variables lose some of their explanatory power because of the contradictory effects 
observed in different regions. 
While each of these chapters discuss very different topics there is a common 
theme binding them together. Each of the topics analyzed in this thesis is assumed to be 
heavily influenced by electoral system design. The design of the electoral system allows 
for the three possible means for calling an election that are discussed in Chapter 2. A key 
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component of the analysis in Chapter 3 is Duverger's contention that the design of the 
electoral system is the primary determinant of the number of parties. The timing of 
elections, number of competitive parties and margin of victory are all influenced by the 
electoral system design and appear as independent variables in the analysis of voter 
turnout in Chapter 4. Therefore, even though each chapter represents a separate analysis, 
the electoral system and its consequences figure prominently in the conclusions of each 
chapter. 
Canada and Its Regions 
In order to analyze the three topics discussed above, I have drawn on several 
elections from Canada. There are several reasons why Canadian elections are an 
appropriate sample for this analysis. First and foremost, I believe that Canada is an 
understudied country within American political science. Canada has one of the longest 
running uninterrupted democracies in the world and has a population of roughly thirty-
Table 1.1 
Canada Population Breakdown as of2001 
Note: 
* Indicates territory 
Province/Territory 
Newfoundland 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Yukon* 
Northwest Territories* 
Nunavut* 
Canada 
Source: Statistics Canada Website <www.statcan.ca>. 
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Population 
533,761 
138,514 
942,691 
757,077 
7,410,504 
11,874,436 
1,150,034 
1,015,783 
3,064,249 
4,095,934 
29,885 
40,860 
28,159 
31,081,887 
one million people residing in ten provinces and three territories (see Figure 1.1 for a map 
of Canada and Table 1.1 for a population breakdown by province and territory). 
Canada is an appropriate country to use for the election timing analysis in Chapter 
2 because it has had elections called for various reasons (e.g., reaching the maximum 
time allowable between elections, the government calling early elections and the 
government being forced to hold early elections due to the loss of a no confidence vote in 
parliament). 
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Canada is often cited as an exception to Duverger's law. Duverger himself 
recognized this potential problem and argued that regionalism in Canadian politics could 
provide the explanation for that apparent exception. For this reason, as well as the fact 
that Gaines (1999) presents an analysis of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law, 
Canada provides an appropriate subject of the analysis in Chapter 3. 
Since I am including the variables of time between elections and the number of 
competitive parties that are analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3 as independent variables in the 
voter turnout analysis presented in Chapter 4, it is logical to further develop continuity by 
using Canada as the subject of that analysis as well. Finally, another reason for this study 
is the abundance of data available for Canada regarding each of the topics for the period 
from 1935 to 2000. 
For the purposes of a regional study in Chapter 4, the provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec and British Columbia will each represent a region while Newfoundland, Prince 
Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick will be grouped together as the 
Maritime Provinces, and Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta will be grouped together 
as the Prairie Provinces. Due to the fact that each of the territories (e.g., Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) consists of only one electoral district, they are not 
included in any regional analysis but are factored into the aggregate totals. 
Canadian Electoral System and Government Formation 
Canada has a parliamentary system of government modeled on the British system 
that currently has 301 electoral districts that are called ridings. The number of ridings has 
grown from 245 since 1935 (the first year that is involved in my analysis). Each of the 
ridings sends one representative to the national parliament. Those representatives are 
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elected based on a single ballot, simple-majority electoral formula, in which the candidate 
that receives the most votes wins. Once the representatives have been elected, the party 
that holds the majority of seats selects the prime minister (who in tum chooses the rest of 
the cabinet). In the absence of a majority party, there are two options. Either a group of 
two or more parties will align themselves together in order to form a coalition 
government, or a minority government will be formed. However, there has not been a 
coalition government in Canada since World War I so all of the governments under 
consideration in this study are either single majority or minority governments. 
The maximum time allowed between elections in Canada is five years. Unlike 
presidential regimes that have fixed election times, most parliamentary regimes have 
provisions for the calling of early elections. In the case of Canada, this can come about 
in two ways. The government can be forced to hold early elections if they lose a 
confidence vote in the parliament, or the government can choose to call the elections 
early. 
Canadian Political Parties 
Throughout the 1935 to 2000 period, there have been only two parties that have 
formed the government of Canada (for a listing of the major Canadian political parties 
see Table 1.2). The Liberal Party (LP) and the Conservative Party (now known as the 
Progressive Conservative Party or PC) have been the two mainstays among the party 
competition during this period. While other parties have come and gone, the LP and PC 
have been represented in each parliament included in this study. Several other parties 
have been represented periodically including the Social Credit Party (SCP), the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Bloc 
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Quebecois (BQ) and the Canadian Alliance Party or CAP (formerly known as the Reform 
Party or RP). The current parliament contains representatives from the LP, PC, BQ, NDP 
and CAP parties. The SCP is no longer in existence, and the CCF evolved into the NDP. 
As with many democracies, there are also minor parties that receive votes but have never 
seriously challenged to become a political force. This presents a sharp contrast to the 
American system in which only the Republican and Democratic parties have had 
significant representation since the mid 1800's. While the electoral systems are similar, 
the Canadian party system has demonstrated much greater fluidity than the American 
party system (though Canada has also had an extended period in which only two parties 
have formed the government). 
Note: 
Table 1.2 
Canadian Political Parties 
Party Name Abbreviation 
Liberal Party LP 
Progressive Conservatives PC 
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation I CCF/NDP 
New Democratic Party 
Social Credit Party SCP 
Reform Party I Canadian Alliance Party RP/CAP 
Bloc Quebecois BQ 
1Years in parliament represent only the years that are included in this study. 
Years in 
Parliament1 
1935 -
1935 -
1935 -
1935 - 1957 
1962 - 1979 
1993 -
1993 -
Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac 
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-
1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
As with much of the Canadian political system, the ideological basis for the 
political parties is largely based on the country's European heritage and the influence of 
the U.S. The British welfare state and ideas regarding the social responsibilities of 
government that were held by its founders are cornerstones for the ideology of the LP 
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(Christian and Campbell 1990). This party has been the most consistently successful 
party during the twentieth century. Out of the twenty governments included in this study, 
fourteen of them were formed by the LP. The six times that they did not form the 
government, they were the largest opposition party. 
The ideological stance of the PC was heavily influenced by the British Tory Party 
in its earlier stages and later on by Reaganomics and neo-conservatism from the U.S. 
(Christian and Campbell 1990). The Conservatives were the second most successful 
party during most of the 1935 to 2000 period. They were able to form the government 
six times and were the largest opposition party eleven times. The PC's fortunes changed 
dramatically in the 1993 election in which they lost 167 seats and for the first time were 
no longer either the government or opposition party. This was partly due to the formation 
of the ideologically similar RP. 
European socialism also played a role in shaping the ideology of some Canadian 
political parties. The British Labour Party provided much of the inspiration for the SCP 
and CCF parties (Christian and Campbell 1990). As the NDP was replacing the CCF and 
SCP parties, its leaders turned to the Swedish socialist government, the German Social 
Democrats and the Mitterand government in France for ideological guidance and ideas 
(Christian and Campbell 1990). None of these parties ever achieved the level of electoral 
success necessary to form a government or serve as the opposition, but at various times, 
they were each able to achieve a consistent level of representation allowing them to 
influence government. 
A more recent development in Canadian political parties is the emergence of 
parties with a highly regional base of support and ideology. Beginning with the Parti 
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Quebecois (PQ) at the provincial level in Quebec and growing with the formation of the 
BQ at the national level, Quebec separatism has formed the foundation of a substantial 
political movement. Both of these parties run candidates solely within the province of 
Quebec. The PQ has served as the government of Quebec on multiple occasions since 
they first rose to power in 1976. The BQ received its largest share of seats in a stunning 
result in the 1993 general election in which they won enough seats to serve in the position 
of the opposition party (this came after the close vote in the 1992 Quebec referendum for 
independence). 
The RP came into existence mainly as a splinter from the PC helping to cause its 
1993 collapse and consisting mainly of representatives from the western provinces. 
While western separatism has been an issue, the RP also represented the more 
conservative elements of Canadian politics which has allowed them to maintain at least 
some nationwide popularity. Since renamed the CAP, the RP has served as the 
opposition following the last two general elections. 
While there are certainly some ideological differences and even regional 
differences between the parties, they still generally fall into the category of catch-all 
parties as described by Kirchheimer (1966). The movement away from a strong 
ideological base has left parties vulnerable to the emergence of parties with similar 
ideological tendencies but with stronger individual leaders or organizational skills (Mair 
1989). While political ideology is not a focus of this thesis per se, the number of political 
parties is possibly a function of the ideological distance between parties. The number of 
competitive political parties is a critical component of Chapters 3 and 4. Since 
compliance with Du verger's law is based on the number of political parties, how we 
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measure that particular quantity is a very important issue that will be examined in depth 
in Chapter 3. The number of competitive parties is also hypothesized to be a factor in 
voter turnout so it factors significantly into the analysis in Chapter 4. 
Contributions of this Study 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of the timing of elections on the government party 
in Canadian parliamentary elections. The study of the timing of elections has had its 
focus mainly on presidential regimes. This literature explores the differences between 
concurrent and non-concurrent elections, and how they impact the party of the president. 
The timing of elections clearly has an impact on the performance of political parties in 
presidential regimes, yet this area has received little attention in parliamentary studies. 
Chapter 2 shows that this is an area that should receive greater study in parliamentary 
regimes by demonstrating that the party that holds the position of government entering 
the election is affected differently depending on why the election was called. 
Chapter 3 turns to an evaluation of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law. 
This law states that the single-ballot simple-majority electoral system used by Canada 
should produce a two party system. However, Canada is an often-cited exception to this 
law because there are consistently more than two parliamentary parties. Duverger argued 
that the reason that Canada appears to be an exception is that the two party competition 
that he was referring to occurs at the riding (or district) level instead of at the national 
level. He also states that the reason for multipartism at the national level is that different 
regional parties challenge the national parties in different regions. This notion was 
challenged by Gaines (1999) in a study in which he determined that two-party 
competition did not accurately describe the national or riding level. Gaines also finds 
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that there was no regional effect contributing to this determination. Chapter 3 adds to 
Gaines' analysis by including the 1997 and the 2000 elections which confirms his results 
as long as the same measures are employed. I propose some additional measures, 
particularly an analysis of the competitive number of parties based on the share of seats 
received instead of using votes received as Gaines did, that present a drastically different 
story. This chapter calls into question the generally accepted method for measuring the 
number of competitive parties and provides some empirical rather than anecdotal support 
for Du verger's contention that Canada is not an exception. 
The two primary approaches to the study of voter turnout address vastly different 
sets of variables. The socioeconomic behavioral approach stems primarily from the study 
of American politics and focuses on variables such as education and income (Almond 
and Verba 1963; Campbell et. al. 1960; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, 
Brady and Nie 1993). The institutional approach is seen mostly in comparative studies 
and involves variables such as the number of parties, type of electoral system, type of 
government and performance variables such as the margin of victory and reelection of 
incumbents (Gray and Caul 2000; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Studlar 
2001). Chapter 4 presents a longitudinal analysis of Canadian turnout using the 
institutional variables explored in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as a snapshot analysis of the 
1997 Canadian election. For the analysis of voter turnout in the 1997 election, I use a 
combination of socioeconomic and institutional variables in a riding level analysis. 
The major contribution of each of these chapters is the demonstration of a need 
for further research in each of these areas including a re-conceptualization of the 
operationalization of certain variables used in the analysis. The findings in Chapter 2 
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show that the study of election timing and its impact on representation should not be 
limited to presidential regimes. Parliamentary regimes provide a unique area for study 
because the government has some control over the timing of elections. If it can be shown 
that timing affects outcomes, then the logical extension of that finding is that the 
government has some control over the outcome of elections. The findings in Chapter 3 
suggest that Du verger's regional explanation for Canadian exceptionalism was correct. 
These findings are based on using seat shares in order to determine the number of 
competitive parties instead of the traditionally accepted vote shares. The voter turnout 
analysis in Chapter 4 includes a combination of the socioeconomic and institutional 
approaches to the study of this phenomenon and demonstrates some of the flaws of 
performing an aggregate level analysis. The aggregate picture is distorted by combining 
regions in which the independent variables have profoundly different impacts. 
Methodology and Data 
Due to the vastly different nature of each of the three topics covered in this study, 
there is no one methodology that is appropriate for all of them. Chapter 2 is mainly a 
qualitative study in order to determine if there is merit for a broader quantitative study 
into the relationship between the timing of elections and the impact that this has on the 
party in government. Chapter 3 involves the use of mathematical calculations to 
determine the number of competitive parties. Chapter 4 uses linear regression as the 
form of statistical analysis because it is most appropriate for analyzing the relationship of 
ratio level variables (including a single dummy variable). Each of these methods is 
appropriate for the topic under discussion in each chapter, and they present logical 
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opportunities for future research. Any single method of analysis is not enough to develop 
a complete picture and will leave important questions unanswered. 
I chose to use the single case study of Canada for each of these chapters in order 
to maintain continuity between them. By focussing on a single country, it allows me to 
control for many potential intervening variables while at the same time demonstrating the 
need for further comparative study. The availability of the data was also a factor in the 
decision to focus solely on Canada. The longitudinal Canadian election data makes the 
findings of these chapters even more valid. 
14 
Chapter 2 
Impact of the Timing of Elections on the Party in Government: 
Examples from the Canadian Case, 1940-2000 
Introduction 
An important area that is emerging as a focus of study in political science is the 
impact that the timing of elections has on government formation. Much of the work in 
this area has focused on presidential regimes and the impact that can be observed when 
comparing concurrent and non-concurrent election results (Scheve and Tomz 1999; 
Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). The discussion on election timing in 
parliamentary regimes focuses on the use of no confidence votes to dissolve the cabinet 
and the government and the implications for economic policy making (Huber 1996; 
Huber and McCarty 2001; Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999). 
A commonly found feature in parliamentary democracies is a limit on the 
maximum amount of time that can pass between elections. The government, however, 
has the power to call elections before the completion of a specific time period. There are 
three possible methods of selecting the time for a parliamentary election: The government 
can choose to wait for the maximum allowable time, the government can call for early 
elections, or they can be forced to hold them due to a no confidence vote. 
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of the timing of parliamentary elections 
through an examination of Canadian general elections during the period of 1940 to 2000. 
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I have developed three hypotheses for this chapter, one relating to each of the possible 
methods for calling an election: 
Hypothesis 1: If the maximum amount of time passes between elections, the government 
party entering the election will lose seats or at the most maintain their seat share. The 
fact that they waited the full term indicates that there was no surge in their popularity for 
them to capitalize on, and that they were attempting to maximize their time in power by 
holding office until the end. 
Hypothesis 2: If the government calls an election early, it will increase its number of 
seats. The fact that the government has chosen to hold the election early indicates that 
they must have a logical reason for doing so, and the most appropriate reason is to 
capitalize on an increase in popularity in order to increase their seat share. 
Hypothesis 3: If the election is held because of a no confidence vote, the result will be a 
loss of seats for the government party. A no confidence vote sends a message to the 
electorate that the government is incapable of doing its job and can quite possibly lead to 
a change in the party in power. 
There are several variables that I will look at to test these hypotheses. In each 
case, the dependent variable is the change in number of seats after an election for the 
party that held the position of government entering the election. The independent 
variables are the reason that the election was called, the length of time between the 
elections and the type of government prior to the election. The reasons for calling an 
election have been outlined above and are fairly straightforward. An election can be the 
result of a decision by the government to hold early elections, can be forced by a no 
confidence vote or can be called in order to comply with the proscribed time limit 
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approaching. The time between elections is simply the time that has passed since the last 
general election. The type of government prior to the election can be either one formed 
by a party that holds a parliamentary majority, or in the absence of a majority, a minority 
government (a coalition of multiple parties is also a possibility but has not occurred in 
Canada since World War I). 
Election Timing in Presidential Regimes 
As stated above, one of the primary focuses of the research on the timing of 
elections revolves around concurrent and non-concurrent elections in presidential 
regimes. Scheve and Tomz (1999) discuss the midterm loss typically observed by the 
party of the president in U. S. congressional elections. They determine that this loss can 
be attributed to the desire of moderate supporters of the president to maintain a balance 
between the executive and legislature to ensure that they can provide effective checks on 
each other. Shugart (1995), in both his individual work and his work with Carey (1992), 
agrees with this assessment of non-concurrent elections relative to the desire of the 
electorate to maintain a balance of power. The demonstration that election timing 
influences outcomes in presidential regimes does not directly apply to my work, but it 
serves as a basis to show that election timing is an important variable that should be 
studied. Both the Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Carey (1992) pieces include findings 
based on election timing in presidential regimes that are analogous to events in 
parliamentary regimes and are discussed further below. 
Shugart (1995) determines that concurrent elections in presidentialism are more 
likely to produce a unified government. He also finds that the timing of non-concurrent 
elections has a significant impact on their outcomes. According to him, elections for 
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other offices that follow closely the election of the president generally show a growth in 
support for the president's party and that this support decreases as the temporal distance 
from the presidential election increases. 
Shugart and Carey (1992) discuss the president's "honeymoon" period. They 
determine that elections during the first year of the president's term are the most 
beneficial for his/her party (Shugart and Carey 1992). As a final note on the honeymoon 
period, Shugart and Carey (1992) contend that elections held during that time frame tend 
to benefit third parties as well as the president's party at the expense of the second largest 
party. These findings can have important implications in parliamentarism that are not 
present in presidentialism. Since the government controls the timing of the next election 
in many parliamentary regimes, they can use this increase in popularity (the so-called 
honeymoon period) to their advantage by calling an early election to capitalize on this 
opportunity. 
Electoral Cycles and Parliamentary Regimes 
As far as the research on electoral cycles and parliamentary governments, there is 
a diverse range of topics covered, but not a significant amount of literature specifically 
addressing the institutional rules and constraints covering election timing. Huber (1996) 
identifies the need for more empirical research in the area of election timing, status of the 
government (majority versus coalition) and governmental popularity among other areas. 
He emphasizes that the presence of the confidence vote in parliamentary regimes is an 
important element that deserves to be a larger focus of the study of parliamentarism. 
Huber and McCarty (2001) examine the confidence vote by analyzing the differences 
between regimes in which the prime minister has unilateral power to demand the vote and 
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those in which the cabinet must approve such a decision. They determine that both 
circumstances can result in the inefficient termination of a cabinet and possibly 
inefficient dissolution of the government. 
Much of the research on parliamentary electoral cycles involves financial policy 
(i.e., budgeting and tax increases or decreases) and the impact of economic events on the 
outcomes of elections (Johnston 1999; Petry et. al. 1999). In a study of Canadian 
provincial governments, Petry et. al. (1999) argue that economic policy is coordinated 
with predicted election timing in order to maximize the potential benefits from positive 
economic outlooks. They argue that the direction of causality is the important finding. 
They find that the government's perceptions about the possibility of calling a new 
election dictate its fiscal policy instead of the relationship in the other direction. In a 
study of the political business cycle and government popularity in Canadian elections, 
Johnston (1999) argues that there is a popularity cycle for the government party that 
exists between elections regardless of the economic conditions. He finds that 
government's popularity rises substantially closely following an election, then maintains 
a small variation near that peak until the next election approaches when it crashes back 
down to, or below, the level of the previous election. This parliamentary finding is very 
similar to the presidential findings of both Shugart (1995) and Shugart and Carey (1992). 
Lupia and Strom (1995) contend that the two games that are constantly going on 
in parliamentary governments involve coalition building based on past results and an 
effort to predict the results of the next election and plan accordingly. They also conclude 
that the anticipation of the behavior of the electorate plays a critical role in determining 
the stability of both the cabinet and the government (Lupia and Strom 1995). Diermeier 
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and Stevenson (2000) build on Lupia and Strom's (1995) work and come to some 
additional conclusions. They argue that as a government approaches its maximum 
allowable time without an election, the benefits from staying in office decrease and 
thereby lead to more minor events being capable of leading to the dissolution of 
parliament. 
Baron (1998) concludes that the length of the constitutionally allowed period 
between elections as well as the argument about minor events becoming more critical as 
the end of that period nears are the important factors contributing to the possibility of 
government termination. He argues that the proper way to study the longevity of 
parliamentary governments would be a combination of those two factors with an analysis 
of the political attributes of the state and society focusing on cleavages, institutions and 
party structure (Baron 1998). 
In a finding that relates to one of the elections in this study, Weller (1994) shows 
that Canadian prime ministers have never been expressly forced out by their party even in 
times when they possessed very low popularity. Instead they make the choice to step 
aside on their own terms for the most part, possibly under pressure to resign, but never 
expressly removed from the position by their own party (Weller 1994). This is relevant 
to the work in this chapter because the 1968 Canadian election was called in an effort to 
consolidate the leadership following the resignation of a prime minister (Feigert 1989). 
Implications 
The electoral cycle and the timing of elections are important areas of study with 
implications on different aspects of party systems, government formation and 
government dissolution as well as policy implications. However, there is little in the area 
20 
of election timing and its effects on parties in parliamentary regimes. The information 
that does exist is mostly theoretical and speculatively based on opinion polls (Johnston 
1999) or evidence from presidential regimes (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). 
I examine the reason that an election was called and the resulting effect on the 
seat total of the party that held the position of government prior to the election in order to 
determine if any patterns can be observed. The importance of this research is that by 
presenting an empirical analysis of the relationship between election timing and the 
electoral fortunes of the government party, I demonstrate that this is an area deserving of 
the further inquiry. 
Data and Methodology 
There are four sources used for the data presented in this chapter. The bulk of the 
data comes from Canada Votes 1935-1988 by Feigert (1989). This volume covers all of 
the Canadian general elections during the 1935 to 1988 period. Information regarding the 
1993 election was reported in Eagles et al. ( 1995) The Almanac of Canadian Politics. 
Data for the 1997 election can be found in the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada's Thirty-
Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis, and the 2000 election is in 
the Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 
I calculated the change in the number of seats for the government party by 
subtracting the number of seats that that party received in the previous election from the 
number that they earned in the election in question. The same method was used to 
determine the change in seats for the principle opposition party which was identified as 
the party with the largest number of seats prior to the election that did not form the 
government. Time between elections is also a subtraction calculation with all numbers 
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rounded off using six months as the cut-off. The type of government and the reason for 
calling the election have been determined from an examination of seat shares and the 
brief descriptions about each election provided in the data sources. 
For the purposes of determining if an election was called early or called because 
of the five-year time limit, I set a cut-off point at nine months before the expiration. Any 
election called with more than nine months remaining was coded as an early call by the 
government. This was the hardest of the variables to operationalize because of the 
arbitrary nature of the decision and the lack of literature to use as guidance. I chose nine 
months because I felt that a full year would be too long to consider early while six 
months was too limited. This decision will be revisited below in the discussion of the 
results. 
A strength of the data is that there were nineteen elections in the 1940 to 2000 
period providing a good sample size for this initial study. A second strength that will be 
discussed in more length in the analysis of the results is that there is a good amount of 
variance in the values of the independent variables allowing for a more complete analysis 
of their impact on the dependent variable. 
The most significant weakness that I see in this data is in my calculation of the 
change in number of seats. Since the base number used for the calculation is the seat 
total resulting from the previous election, any by-elections to fill vacated seats that 
occurred in the intervening period are not factored into the equation. I anticipate that 
accounting for the changes in seat total between elections would have some effect on the 
magnitude of the seat change. However, I expect that that change would be minimal 
since the number of by-elections is generally very small and due to the magnitudes that 
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were observed it is unlikely that this inclusion would have an effect of the direction of the 
seat change, which is the critical component of my analysis. This does, however, present 
a possible area for future expansion of this research. 
As this is primarily an initial study into the impact of election timing in a 
parliamentary regime, I have chosen not to attempt complex statistical analysis in order to 
determine the precise relationship. The central methodology to this work involves an 
examination of the frequencies of the independent variables and a preliminary assessment 
of their relationship with the dependent variable of change in the number of seats for the 
government party. This is the best method of analysis for the data in question due to the 
primarily nominal nature of the independent variables. 
Discussion and Results 
An important fact to note is that there is some alternation of power exhibited in 
these elections. As shown in Table 2.1, both the Liberal and the Conservative parties 
spend time as the government party and as the opposition. They also each presided over 
three minority governments during their terms in office. This is important to note 
because it reduces the possibility that the conclusions made are party specific. If the 
results are not party specific, then it becomes increasingly likely that they are a product of 
systemic features. While a party specific outcome would have limited any findings to the 
specific case of Canada and these particular parties, a systemic effect should also be 
applicable to other similar parliamentary governments. 
The first hypothesis was in regards to the effect of waiting the maximum possible 
time (five years in the case of Canada) to call an election and its impact on the 
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government party's seat change. I posited that the maximum length represented a lack of 
opportunity for the government to gain seats by calling an election early and that the 
Table 2.1 
Government Party, Opposition Party, and Government Type Preceding Elections: 1940 to 2000 
Year Government Part:y 01mosition Part:y T:yJ!e of Government 
1940 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1945 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1949 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1953 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1957 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1958 Conservative Liberal Minority 
1962 Conservative Liberal Majority 
1963 Conservative Liberal Minority 
1965 Liberal Conservative Minority 
1968 Liberal Conservative Minority 
1972 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1974 Liberal Conservative Minority 
1979 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1980 Conservative Liberal Minority 
1984 Liberal Conservative Majority 
1988 Conservative Liberal Majority 
1993 Conservative Liberal Majority 
1997 Liberal Bloc Quebecois Majority 
2000 Liberal Reform/ Alliance Majority 
Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac 
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-
1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
result would be a negative seat change or no change at all. The seat change for both the 
government and opposition parties as well as the reason for calling the election and the 
time between elections can be seen in Table 2.2. This hypothesis appears to be correct. 
The government waited the full five years in six of the nineteen cases under analysis. In 
five of those six instances the government party lost seats, with the exception being 1940, 
the first election in the study. The five losses were substantial as well. The smallest total 
of seats lost was twenty-seven in 1979. It appears that waiting the full five years is not a 
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good strategy for a government party to undertake. Possible reasons for this phenomenon 
will be discussed below. 
Table 2.2 
Party Seat Change and the Reason for and Timing of Canadian Elections: 1940 to 2000 
Government Party Opposition Party Reason Years Since 
Year Seat Change Seat Change For Election Previous Election 
1940 8 0 Five Year Limit 5 
1945 -56 27 Five Year Limit 5 
1949 65 26 Govt. Called Early 4 
1953 -19 10 Govt. Called Early 4 
1957 -66 61 Govt. Called Early 4 
1958 96 -56 Forced 
1962 -92 50 Govt. Called Early 4 
1963 -21 30 Forced 1 
1965 2 2 Govt. Called Early 2 
1968 14 -25 Govt. Called Early 3 
1972 -46 35 Five Year Limit 5 
1974 32 -12 Govt. Called Early 2 
1979 -27 41 Five Year Limit 5 
1980 -33 33 Forced 
1984 -107 108 Five Year Limit 5 
1988 -42 43 Govt. Called Early 4 
1993 -167 94 Five Year Limit 5 
1997 -22 -10 Govt. Called Early 4 
2000 17 6 Govt. Called Early 3 
Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac 
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-
1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
The second hypothesis involves elections that are called early by the government. 
The anticipated result in this case would be a gain in seats for the government party. In 
ten of the nineteen cases, elections were the result of an early call by the government. In 
50% of these elections, the government party gained seats. While the picture appears to 
be mixed, a reassessment of the operationalization of early election calls presents a 
slightly different conclusion for each of the first two hypotheses. If the limit for inclusion 
as a full five-year election cycle is extended to include all elections called within the final 
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twelve months, four cases would be re-classified from early elections to full five year 
elections. The results of this change as it pertains to the elections previously categorized 
as early elections can be seen in Table 2.3. This change would adjust the breakdown of 
full term cases to a total of ten, with two cases in which the government party gained 
seats and eight instances in which they lost seats. This only strengthens the previous 
findings in relation to waiting the full time to call elections. It also demonstrates that 
these variables are highly sensitive to operationalization and that this is an area that will 
need to be addressed in any further investigation. 
Table2.3 
Re-operationalization of Early Elections from a Nine Month to a Twelve Month Cut-Off 
Government Party 12 Month 
Year Seat Change Cut-Off Limit 
1949 65 Five Year 
1953 -19 Five Year 
1957 -66 Govt. Called Early 
1962 -92 Five Year 
1965 2 Govt. Called Early 
1968 14 Govt. Called Early 
1974 32 Govt. Called Early 
1988 -42 Five Year 
1997 -22 Govt. Called Early 
2000 17 Govt. Called Early 
Sources: Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-
Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer 
of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief 
Electoral Officer of Canada. 
After the re-classification, six elections are still considered to be early calls by the 
government. Of those six, four times the government party gained seats and only twice 
did they lose seats. Coincidentally, the two elections that represent government losses in 
this category are 1957 and 1997 which also happen to represent the two longest durations 
between elections among these six cases. This certainly seems to suggest that the 
government benefits the most from calling an election early in their mandate; although, 
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the results remain murky due to the operational sensitivity of the independent variable. 
This finding is interesting in that it relates to the "honeymoon period" discussed by 
Shugart and Carey (1992). The main difference in this instance is that rather than 
capitalizing on the honeymoon period through party gains in municipal or other lower 
level elections, the government party is able to tum their honeymoon into more seats in 
parliament and a stronger position in government. 
Another interesting note about elections that were called early by the government 
involves minority governments. By comparing Table 2.1 to Table 2.3, it can be seen that 
three of the six early call decisions (1965, 1968 and 1974) were made by minority 
governments. All three of those early elections resulted in a seat gain for the government 
party. In two out of the three instances, the seat gain was enough for the party to 
establish a majority government. The possibility of gaining enough seats to form a 
majority is a very good incentive for minority governments to call early elections. 
The third hypothesis was that elections forced by a vote of no confidence would 
result in a decrease in seats for the government party and most likely their defeat. As 
Table 2.2 shows, there were only three cases in which this situation arose, and once again 
the results are mixed. In two of the three cases, the government party lost seats and their 
position. In 1958 the Conservatives not only gained seats, but they were able to switch 
from a minority government to a majority party government. It is possible that this 
instance is an anomaly but that would certainly require a larger sample size to determine. 
There is one other extremely important variable that could possibly have had an 
impact on the seat gain that I have not included in the discussion so far and that is the size 
of the parliament. The number of members of parliament changed six times during the 
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period under investigation. The first year in which each new assembly size was used and 
the change from the previous size can be seen in Table 2.4. While it is undeniable that 
Table 2.4 
Change in the Total Number of Members of Parliament: 1940 to 2000 
Year Number of Seats Change 
1940 245 
1949 262 17 
1953 265 3 
1968 264 -1 
1979 282 18 
1988 295 13 
1997 301 6 
Sources: Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Sixth 
General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of 
Canada. 
the number of seats available will have some effect on the number of seats that a party 
wins, an examination of the elections that coincided with the changes in parliament's size 
demonstrates that this does not present a significant challenge to my findings. In each of 
the six cases in which the parliament's size changed, the government party's number of 
seats moved in the opposite direction. When the assembly size was increased, the 
government party lost seats, and in the one instance that it was decreased, the government 
party gained seats. This could possibly be a backlash against the government for re-
districting and a result of incumbents losing some of their advantage by having different 
constituents. The exception to this rule that occurred in 1949 does not present a 
challenge to my findings. The number of seats was increased by seventeen that year, but 
the government party gained sixty-five seats. While the additional available seats may 
have played a role in that increase, there was still clearly something else at work driving 
the Liberal's seat increase as it is substantially larger than could be accounted for by 
those added to the parliament. 
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Conclusion 
As the analysis indicates, the first hypothesis seems to be accurate. It appears that 
using the full term allowable between elections is not a good decision for governing 
parties. The general trend observed from both of the first two hypotheses is that the 
longer the government waits to call the election, the worse their chances for gaining seats. 
Conversely, it appears that the odds for success increase if the government calls the 
election early. The earlier the better, and it is possible that this is a representation of the 
honeymoon period commonly associated with lower level elections in presidential 
regimes and the governmental popularity cycle identified in parliamentary regimes 
(Johnston 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992). 
It is also possible that there is a relationship between the full five-year wait and 
the mid-term backlash phenomenon often observed in presidential regimes (Scheve and 
Tomz 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). While the government party lost 
seats in eight of the ten cases in which it waited near the maximum allowable time to call 
the election, they only lost their position as the governing party three of those times. This 
could be a demonstration of some level of frustration with the government from the 
electorate and a desire to send a message without removing them from power. Another 
possible manifestation of this phenomenon can be seen in the fact that in fifteen of the 
nineteen elections under consideration, the opposition party heading into the election 
either gained seats or maintained their pre-election level of representation. 
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To really test the third hypothesis would require more cases. Three cases are not 
enough to determine a pattern (especially when there is a significant difference in one of 
them). A larger sample size would be necessary to reach any real conclusions, and this is 
true of all three hypotheses. While these results are important, it is impossible to make 
larger generalizations to parliamentary regimes as a whole given the limited number of 
cases. What I believe that this research does accomplish is to show that election timing 
in parliamentary regimes is an area worthy of further scholarly inquiry. A cross-national 
study incorporating other parliamentary democracies in which the government and 
opposition have similar powers regarding the calling or forcing of elections would be the 
best way in which to fully ascertain the impact of election timing on the fortunes of the 
government party. 
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Chapter 3 
Canadian Exceptionalism to Duverger's Law: Gaines Revisited 
Introduction 
The premises and implications of Duverger' s law have been the subject of a vast 
body of literature within the field of political science. Duverger states that "the simple-
majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system"(l964, 217). He further 
states that apparent exceptions can be explained away by factors such as regionalism 
within states, or by looking at the district rather than national level. Du verger argues that 
when a state has a multi-party system at the national level it is not an exception if there is 
still two-party competition at the district level as long as there are different parties 
competing in different regions. One implication of Duverger' s law is that electoral 
design is the determinant of party structure within a state, specifically through 
influencing the number of parties that exist. According to Duvergerian logic, a decision 
to implement a single-ballot, plurality type system is destined to produce a two-party 
system. While Duverger mentions that historical factors such as social cleavages may 
also contribute to the development of two-party competition, this institutional factor is 
perceived as the critical component (1964, 217). 
Two of the most commonly noted exceptions to this "law" are India and Canada. 
Gaines (1999) studies Canadian General Elections from 1935 through 1993 in order to 
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assess the status of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law by focusing on district 
level rather than aggregate data. One of Duverger's assertions is that when it appears that 
multi-party systems have developed at the national level in plurality-based systems with 
single member districts (SMDs), the district (or riding as it is called in Canada) level is 
still categorized as two-party competition (1964, 222). In other words, even though 
several parties are represented in the national assembly, a country can still comply with 
Duverger's law if the individual districts demonstrate two-party competition without the 
same two parties competing in each district. Gaines finds multipartism at both the 
national and the district level. 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend Gaines' analysis by including data from 
the last two Canadian elections that took place in 1997 and 2000 and also to incorporate 
some additional measures in order to expand the findings. The hypothesis of this chapter 
is that the appearance of Canadian exceptionalism at the national level also holds true 
when examining the data on a riding-by-riding or district-level basis as long as Gaines' 
methods are employed. I examine the electoral results from each of the 301 ridings for 
the general elections of 1997 and 2000 and compare the results to those achieved by 
Gaines in his earlier study as well as presenting some additional measures that diverge 
from his findings. An analysis of the number of competitive parties based on seat shares 
supports Du verger's contention that the presence of regional parties is the reason for the 
multipartism at the national level. 
Duverger's Law 
Duverger proposed that single-ballot, plurality elections with SMDs tend to 
produce two-party competition. He also proposed that "the simple-majority system with 
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second ballot and proportional representation favour multipartism" (Duverger 1964, 239). 
Riker terms the first statement Duverger's law and the second Duverger's hypothesis 
(1982, 754). 
Duverger proposes that there were two sets of factors influencing the 
development of two-party systems under plurality elections with SMDs (1964, 224). 
First, he discusses the mechanical effect that is characterized by fusion or elimination. 
Fusion can be characterized as the absorption of minor parties by larger parties in order to 
maximize electoral opportunity; larger parties can co-opt the ideas of smaller parties in 
order to widen their voter support, and smaller parties can use this as a means to achieve 
greater political influence (1964, 224). Elimination is a hybrid of what Duverger terms 
the mechanical and psychological effects. Minor parties are under-represented under this 
type of electoral system in terms of their relative share of seats as compared to their share 
of the vote. Since only the candidate with the most votes is rewarded with a seat, parties 
whose candidates perform well, but come up short of victory, receive no immediate 
reward for their efforts. Unless they perceive that future victory is a legitimate 
possibility, their goals can be more effectively met by joining forces with a larger party 
bringing the larger party greater voter support in exchange for a stronger position of 
political power for the members of the smaller party. Duverger contends that this 
mechanical effect contributes to the psychological effect of voters not wishing to waste 
their vote so they switch their allegiance to the major party that they are most closely 
aligned with (1964, 226). As the voters see that the smaller party that they are aligned 
with does not have a chance to gain representation on its own, they will support a larger 
party in order to have a greater impact on who is representing them in government. 
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Cox (1997) discusses both the mechanical and psychological effects that 
contribute to Duverger's law. Cox concurs with Duverger's assessment that given the 
proper knowledge (i.e., the relative electoral strength of parties or candidates or both in a 
given election), voters will act strategically and produce a trend toward two-party 
competition over time. Palfrey (1989) agrees that if voters act rationally, elections 
involving multiple candidates should result in only two receiving votes. The critical 
component of both the Cox (1987) and Palfrey (1989) analysis is that they rely on the 
voters being completely informed and acting in a completely rational manner with the 
strategic maximization of the impact of their vote being their ultimate goal. In other 
words, they assume that voters will vote for the party that is closest to their ideological 
stance and has a legitimate chance of winning instead of choosing which party to support 
on a strictly ideological basis. 
Blais and Carty (1991) support the institutional approach to studying voting 
behavior by presenting an empirical study that demonstrates that anticipation by voters 
and elites of the mechanical effect leads them to act strategically. They confirm that the 
psychological effect is present but emphasize that since the mechanical effect influences 
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the psychological effect, it should remain the focus of study. Similarly, Taagepera and 
Shugart (1993) state that the aggregate effect of individual actor's actions based on their 
knowledge of the mechanical effects of political institutions are predictable and posit that 
institutional design can therefore be a basis for broader, generalized models of political 
behavior. Through his analysis of competitive party behavior, Strom (1990) also 
emphasizes a need for greater exploration of the impact that political institutions have on 
the behavior of parties and individual actors. Along the same lines, Neal (1998) states 
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that future research in this area should shift from merely establishing a relationship 
between institutional factors and party system development towards establishing 
causation. The emphasis in the literature described above is clearly on the mechanical 
effect which is the logical focus of study as it more readily lends itself to quantitative 
analysis than the psychological effect does. 
National or District Level Focus of Study 
One of the major questions about Duverger's law is whether it applies to the 
national or the district level. Du verger's main argument is based on national level 
analysis, but he does address the relevance of a district level approach. He concedes that 
the district races may be more individualized and that the simple-majority, single-ballot 
system with SMDs: 
... tends to the creation of a two-party system inside the individual constituency, 
but the parties opposed may be different in different areas of the country. The 
simple-majority system therefore makes possible the creation of local parties or 
the retreat of national parties to local positions (1964, 223). 
Gaines (1999) and Reed (2001) present individual country case-studies in which they 
focus on district level data. In the case of Italy, Reed (2001) states that Duverger's law 
should be seen as a two-step process. First, two-candidate competition is established at 
the district level through the mechanical and psychological effects as described above. 
Successful candidates will then gradually coordinate into two parties at the national level 
in order to maximize their effectiveness and influence as legislators. Reed further argues 
that these two processes are complimentary and that it will take time to establish two-
party competition on a nationwide level (Reed 2001). For Canada, Gaines (1999) uses 
hypothetical strategic voting scenarios to demonstrate that while Duverger's law may 
indeed appear at the national level, it is at the district level where it should be most 
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strongly evidenced based on Duverger's explanation of possible exceptions. Gaines' 
findings are discussed in detail further below. 
Canadian Exceptionalism 
Du verger addressed the possibility that Canada is an exception to the law. He 
stated that the appearance of Canadian exceptionalism at the national level could be 
explained away by two-party competition at the local level, with regional parties 
competing in different areas of the country. His argument was that the Liberal and 
Conservative parties were the only national parties, and the Labor and Social-Credit 
parties were concentrated in certain provinces (Duverger 1964, 223). Gaines (1999) 
begins with this assumption and proceeds with a district level analysis of Canadian 
elections from 1935 through 1993 in order to test the hypothesis that two-party 
competition is in existence at the district-level. His results show that this hypothesis does 
not accurately describe party competition in Canada. Gaines (1999) finds that Canada 
exhibits multipartism at both the national and district levels. I have chosen to extend 
Gaines' research to include the 1997 and the 2000 elections in order to determine whether 
or not the patterns discovered by Gaines have continued. In addition, this additional data 
provides me with the opportunity to include other measures that Gaines did not use. 
Since the data for 1997 and 2000 include the results from each individual riding, it is 
possible to look at the margin of victory and the seat distributions for each province. 
These measures tell a different story than that told by the measures that Gaines used. 
Gaines' results are replicated in the 1997 and the 2000 elections, but there are 
some questions posed below regarding the methods he used to analyze the data. I 
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propose that a closer examination of his methods brings the results into question, 
specifically by looking at the results for individual ridings and adding a measure of the 
margin of victory. Additionally, I find that if the analysis is based on seat shares instead 
of vote shares, Canada will not prove to be an exception to Du verger's law. 
Data 
Two sets of data are used in this chapter. First, there are the data gathered by 
Gaines (1999) from the Canadian General Elections from 1935 to 1993. Second, there 
are the additional data that I collected for the 1997 and the 2000 elections. This second 
group of data can be found in the reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada 
published in the Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997: Official Voting Results Synopsis, 
and in the Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000: Official Voting Results Synopsis. 
The variables of vote shares, seat shares and margin of victory were collected 
directly from these sources. These variables were then used in calculations to determine 
the values for the other the variables of the effective number of parties based on both 
votes and seats, as well as the vote share total of the top two parties. Values for the vote 
shares (the percentage of valid votes received) of each party for each of the 301 ridings 
were reported in the Chief Electoral Officer's reports. The margin of victory was also 
reported as a percentage, representing the difference in total vote share of the first and the 
second place candidate in each riding. Seat shares were reported in raw numbers that I 
then converted into percentages for the purpose of comparison to vote shares. Seat shares 
are simply the percentage of available seats that a given party received. The value of the 
top two vote percentage variable was calculated by adding together the percentage of the 
vote of the first and second place candidate in each riding. Finally, the number of 
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competitive parties, in terms of both votes and seats, was determined by using the LT 
index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The LT index is discussed in further 
detail below and in the Appendix. 
One strength of this data set is that it is longitudinal in that it goes back to 1935 
and encompasses twenty elections. There were concerns mentioned in the literature that 
the effects of Duverger's law take time to manifest themselves. This is not a concern 
because of the sixty-five year period covered by this study. Another strength is that for 
both the 1997 and the 2000 election, the data comprises the full 301 ridings. The large 
sample size alleviates concerns that any findings might be anomalous. 
Methodology 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a method for measuring the number of 
effective parties in elections (or assemblies) that is based on their relative size rather than 
a strict counting of those receiving votes (or seats) or developing a threshold point (i.e., 
receiving greater than 10%). The LT index is: 
N= (LP? Y1 
where N equals the number of competitive parties, and pis the vote (or seat) share for the 
i1h party. Their rationale was that this measure provides an easy visualization of the 
number of competitive parties, in contrast to the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration and 
Rae-Taylor fractionalization indices, which also measure the number of parties but 
produce results on a 0 - 1 scale (Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 23-24). I use this index 
both because it is used by Gaines to ascertain the number of effective parties for the 1935 
to 1993 period and due to its acceptance as the standard method for measuring this 
phenomenon (Cox 1997, 29). For an example of the LT index refer to the Appendix. 
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The top two vote percentage which is also used by Gaines and the margin of 
victory are calculations based on the vote totals from each riding. If there is strict two-
party competition then the top two candidates should receive 100% of the votes. The 
further that this value deviates from 100%, the less likely it is that two-party competition 
accurately describes the riding (Gaines 1999, 841). I have included margin of victory 
because it provides insight into whether or not there is really any competition at all 
(which brings into question the results achieved by some of the other measures). 
The LT index and top two vote percentage are appropriate measures for studying 
the relevance of Du verger's law in Canada since they provide an estimate of the effective 
number of parties and measure the distance between the top-two vote getters and the 
Duvergerian hypothesis that they should total 100%. I include the variable of margin of 
victory and an analysis of the number of competitive parties based on seat distribution 
because I believe that they will demonstrate some of the problems with using the other 
measures and stimulate some possible lines of inquiry for further study. 
Discussion and Results 
The addition of the electoral data from the 1997 and 2000 Canadian General 
Elections to Gaines' data set has had the expected result of reaffirming Canadian 
exceptionalism to Du verger's law. As can be seen in Table 3 .1, the average number of 
competitive parties per riding, based on the LT index, in each province as well as at the 
nationwide level remains above two in each case for the 1997 and the 2000 elections and 
above three in several cases. As Table 3.1 indicates, the trends observed by Gaines have 
continued, and two-party competition does not accurately describe Canadian elections at 
either the national or district level. 
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According to Duverger, even when multiple parties are represented in the national 
assembly, under this type of electoral system we should still see two-party competition at 
the local level with different parties in different districts. There are clearly parties that 
perform well in particular geographical regions in the 1997 and the 2000 elections while 
performing poorly or being non-existent in others. The two strongest examples of this 
phenomenon are the Reform/ Alliance (RP/CAP) and the Bloc Quebecois (BQ). The 
RP/CAP party performs quite well in the west while having little electoral presence east 
of Manitoba. With its base of support being Quebec separatism, the BQ is entirely 
limited to Quebec and does not even present candidates outside of the province. 
Table 3.2 
Number of Competitive Parties Distributions for Canadian General Elections: 1935 to 2000 
Year Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
1935 2.68 0.67 1.24 5.54 
1940 2.26 0.49 1.25 4.80 
1945 2.70 0.57 1.60 4.51 
1949 2.36 0.46 1.17 4.18 
1953 2.37 0.57 1.00 4.10 
1957 2.46 0.60 1.00 4.11 
1958 2.24 0.38 1.57 3.69 
1962 2.70 0.44 1.47 3.98 
1963 2.64 0.44 1.39 3.96 
1965 2.69 0.45 1.64 4.02 
1968 2.52 0.40 1.21 3.66 
1972 2.64 0.35 1.50 3.72 
1974 2.51 0.32 1.44 3.32 
1979 2.48 0.36 1.36 3.12 
1980 2.43 0.42 1.48 3.12 
1984 2.53 0.37 1.52 4.04 
1988 2.69 0.38 1.51 3.88 
1993 2.75 0.62 1.42 4.53 
1997 2.89 0.44 1.72 4.48 
2000 2.68 0.44 1.50 3.74 
Sources: Brian J. Gaines. 1999. "Duverger's Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism." 
Comparative Political Studies 32:835-61., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
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While these parties provide evidence that there is an element of regionalism in Canadian 
politics, the fact remains that, as can be seen in Table 3.2, the average riding more closely 
represents three-party competition than two-party competition. 
The second measure that Gaines (1999) used to assess Canada's position relative 
to Duverger's law is the total vote share of the top two candidates in each riding. Under 
Duvergerian two-party competition, this number is expected to be 100%. As can be seen 
in Table 3.3, the data for 1997 and 2000 continues the trend evidenced by the 1935 to 
1993 elections. The average vote share of the top two candidates has been lower than 
85% in every election since 1962. The 75% average in 1997 represents the lowest that 
this measure has been in the entire period under investigation, as does the 92.6% 
Table 3.3 
Average Top Two Vote Share Distributions for Canadian General Elections: 1935 to 2000 
Year Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
1935 81.6 12.4 41.5 100.0 
1940 90.6 11.2 52.8 100.0 
1945 81.5 11.5 55.2 100.0 
1949 88.0 9.6 62.4 100.0 
1953 88.l 11.5 57.8 100.0 
1957 86.l 12.9 51.9 100.0 
1958 90.3 9.2 61.4 100.0 
1962 80.9 9.8 52.7 100.0 
1963 81.8 9.7 55.6 100.0 
1965 80.4 9.8 53.4 100.0 
1968 83.7 8.2 61.0 100.0 
1972 80.6 7.4 63.8 98.2 
1974 83.2 6.6 65.3 100.0 
1979 81.8 5.9 67.5 95.5 
1980 82.5 6.0 67.0 96.1 
1984 82.9 6.6 61.3 96.6 
1988 80.4 7.2 58.8 96.3 
1993 77.4 8.8 56.3 98.0 
1997 75.0 6.8 54.2 92.6 
2000 79.6 6.6 63.8 96.2 
Sources: Brian J. Gaines. 1999. "Duverger's Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism." 
Comparative Political Studies 32:835-61., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
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maximum value in the same year. As recently as 1974, there was at least one instance 
where the vote percentage of the top two candidates totaled 100% leaving no doubt as to 
whether there was greater than two party competition in that particular riding. 
While the results from the 2000 election do show a small increase across the 
board, the 79.6% average top two vote share is still the third lowest total among the 
twenty elections surveyed. With a gap of greater than 20% between the Duvergerian 
expectation and the Canadian reality, this measure provides yet more support for 
Canada's status as a legitimate exception to Duverger's law. The examination of both the 
number of competitive parties and the vote share of the top two finishers, demonstrate 
that Du verger's law is not in evidence in Canadian elections at the riding level. Both 
variables show that strict two-party competition is not an accurate description of voting 
behavior in this case. 
Upon further analysis on a case-by-case basis, it becomes apparent that there are 
some definite weaknesses with these measures. A fairly typical example of the weakness 
regarding the LT index becomes apparent by looking at the results from the Calgary East 
riding in the 1997 election. Five candidates received votes in this riding: The RP 
candidate won with 45%, followed by a Progressive Conservative (PC) candidate with 
24.6%, a Liberal (LP) candidate with 22.8%, a New Democratic Party (NDP) candidate 
with 6.5% and a Natural Law Party (NLP) candidate rounding out the field with 1.1 %. 
The LT index returns a value of 3.13 competitive parties in this riding (see the Appendix 
for this example). While it is clear that three parties received significant electoral support 
by achieving greater than 20% of the vote, the large margin of victory for the RP 
candidate brings into question whether the LT index is a good measure of the number of 
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parties competitively contesting an election. The 3.13 value for the LT index suggests 
that there were slightly greater than three competitive parties in this particular riding. 
However, no candidate was within 20% of the victor. If you combined the vote totals of 
the second and third place finishers, they would have barely been able to defeat the first 
place finisher. There is a large enough quantity of similar results from other ridings to 
suggest that another method for counting competitive parties should be explored. 
Table 3.4 
Average Margin of Victory in Canadian General Elections: 1997 & 2000 
Province 1997 2000 
Newfoundland 8.4 28.2 
Prince Edward Island 4.8 8.5 
Nova Scotia 10.4 11.3 
New Brunswick 14.4 16.4 
Quebec 18.2 19.3 
Ontario 25.9 26.6 
Manitoba 16.2 18.0 
Saskatchewan 12.6 20.5 
Alberta 30.2 36.8 
British Columbia 19.6 25.6 
Net Average 20.8 23.7 
Sources: Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief 
Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. 
Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
The average margin of victory helps to assess the value of the LT index as 
indicated in the example of Calgary East. Table 3.4 shows the average margin of victory 
broken down by provincial and national averages for the 1997 and the 2000 elections. 
With five of the ten provincial cases in 1997 and eight of the ten provincial cases in 2000 
exhibiting average margins in excess of 15%, there is significant evidence that there is a 
lack of competition in general, let alone two-party competition. When it is taken into 
consideration that Ontario accounts for over one-third of the electoral districts and has 
average margins of victory greater than 25% for both of the elections, this general lack of 
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competitiveness is further emphasized. This phenomenon is similar to the vanishing 
marginals observed in the study of American politics. The general concept behind the 
vanishing marginals is that the increase in margin of victory for incumbents is lowering 
the number of races that are close, thereby increasing the incumbency advantage 
(Mayhew 1975). Ansolabehere, Brady and Fiorina (1992) have found that even with a 
large increase in the average margin of victory for incumbents over the last thirty years, 
the percentage of incumbents who are defeated each year has remained relatively 
constant. This finding seems to indicate that margin of victory may not even be the most 
appropriate measure of competitiveness as far as future prospects are concerned, yet I 
believe that it still is a valid measure of how competitive one single election is. 
The results from the riding of Saint-Uonard--Saint-Michel for the 2000 election 
illustrate one problem with the top two vote total measure. The 92.2% value for this 
variable in this riding appears to be a strong indicator that two-party competition is 
occurring. A closer look reveals that the LP candidate received 76.7% of the vote with 
no other candidate receiving greater than 14.5%. It would be difficult to argue that this 
riding represents anything other than single party dominance. Another problem with this 
measure is exposed through an examination of the Windsor--St. Clair riding results from 
2000. The 80.7% value for the top two vote share indicates that this riding does not 
exemplify two-party competition. A closer look at the top three vote finishers shows the 
victorious NDP candidate with 40.8%, the second place LP candidate with 39.9%, and 
the third place RP/CAP candidate with 13.5%. The top two finishers are separated by 
less than one percentage point and are over twenty-five percentage points above the next 
best performer. This certainly seems to be a good example of a two-party race. While 
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there are clearly some problems with the measures, even after further inspection it does 
not appear that two-party competition is an accurate description of Canadian elections. 
Table 3.5 
Effective Number of Parties Vote-Seat Comparison for Canadian General Elections: 1997 & 2000 
1997 2000 
Province Votes Seats Difference Votes Seats Difference 
Newfoundland 2.82 1.96 -0.86 2.60 1.69 -0.91 
Prince Edward Island 2.61 1.00 -1.61 2.59 1.00 -1.59 
Nova Scotia 3.36 1.98 -1.38 3.14 2.95 -0.19 
New Brunswick 3.11 2.63 -0.48 2.85 2.17 -0.68 
Quebec 2.74 2.13 -0.61 2.55 2.05 -0.50 
Ontario 2.88 1.04 -1.84 2.72 1.06 -1.66 
Manitoba 3.24 3.15 -0.09 3.05 3.38 0.33 
Saskatchewan 3.25 2.18 -1.07 2.74 1.82 -0.92 
Alberta 2.54 1.17 -1.37 2.31 1.26 -1.05 
British Columbia 3.02 1.73 -1.29 2.77 1.53 -1.24 
Canada 4.09 2.98 -1.11 3.77 2.54 -1.23 
Sources: Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief 
Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. 
Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
Another method for analyzing the impact of Duverger's law is to examine the 
translation of votes to seats and then assess the number of competitive parties in the 
parliament. Table 3.5 represents a comparison between the number of competitive 
parties based on votes and the number of competitive parties based on seats for the 1997 
and the 2000 elections. It is clear from the results for the number of competitive parties 
based on seats that, in that sense, two-party or even one-party competition is a more 
appropriate description rather than the multipartism suggested by some of the other 
variables. This brings to light another important facet of the discussion of competitive 
parties. What exactly does competitive mean, and how competitive can a party be, 
regardless of vote share, if it is unable to tum votes into seats? According to vote shares, 
Alberta, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island appear to be close to three-party competition 
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in both elections, but when the seat distribution is examined, it appears that they are 
closer to one-party monopolies. 
A second important implication from the number of competitive parties in terms 
of seats comes from a national level examination. The results of 2.98 competitive parties 
in 1997 and 2.54 in 2000 indicate that there were between two and three competitive 
parties in parliament for those years (see Table 3.5). When looking at the actual 
breakdown of parliamentary seats, it is clear that the three parties having the biggest 
impact are the LP with 51.5% and 57.1 %, the RP/CAP with 19.9% and 21.9%, and the 
BQ with 14.6% and 12.6% in the 1997 and 2000 elections respectively. These numbers 
suggest that regionalism might be an explanation for Canadian exceptionalism to 
Du verger. 
The LP is the only example of a party that has had success throughout the 
country. Both the RP/CAP and the BQ derive most of their success from a particular 
region. The BQ has never even run a candidate outside of Quebec. The regional nature 
of party preference is examined in depth for the 1997 election by Gidengil et al. (1999). 
They determine that the political agenda of voters differs from region to region across 
Canada in the critical areas of ideological leaning and economic perceptions. Based on 
his analysis of vote shares, Gaines (1999) rejected the idea that regionalism was the 
explanation for Canadian exceptionalism. The seat share analysis presented in this 
chapter indicates that regionalism does seem to be an appropriate depiction of the nature 
of Canadian exceptionalism to Duverger's law. This area clearly deserves more 
exploration, particularly in light of the fact that it was posited as a reason for Canada's 
apparent exceptionalism by Duverger himself in his initial writings. 
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Conclusion 
After analyzing the data from the 1997 and the 2000 Canadian general elections 
and comparing the results to those found by Gaines (1999), it is clear that these two 
elections fit well into his findings regarding the number of competitive parties and vote 
share of the top two finishers in each riding. The result of Gaines' analysis of both 
variables leads to the conclusion that Canada is an exception to Du verger's law at both 
the national and the district level. However, upon further examination, it appears that 
these two measures may not be the most appropriate. Nevertheless, it does still appear 
that two-party competition does not accurately describe the majority of Canadian ridings. 
In most cases, either multi-party or one-party would be a better way to describe the 
competition. 
With the addition of the data for the 1997 and the 2000 elections, I have been able 
to propose two additional measures (margin of victory and seat-based number of 
competitive parties) that may provide greater insight into the true status of Canadian 
exceptionalism to Du verger's law. If the measure of electoral success is shifted from 
merely receiving votes to actually turning those votes into victories and seats in 
parliament, then a different conclusion can be reached. This analysis supports 
Du verger's contention that regionalism is the primary reason that Canada does not appear 
to comply with his law at the national level. It is clear that in terms of seats, different 
regions can be accurately characterized as two-party competition with different parties 
involved in different regions. Further analysis along these lines can hopefully provide a 
more complete picture. 
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Chapter 4 
Voter Turnout in Canadian General Elections: 
A Longitudinal and Case Study Analysis 
Introduction 
Voter turnout is an important issue in any representative democracy. While it is 
not the only measure of citizen participation, it is a measure that is easily quantifiable and 
therefore is readily accessible for statistical analysis. The issue of voter turnout is of 
particular interest in Canada due to the fact that turnout has been declining steadily over 
the past few general elections (see Table 4.1). The purpose of this chapter is to analyze 
the impact that several factors have had on the determination of voter turnout in Canadian 
elections since 1940 with an emphasis placed on the 1997 election. 
This analysis has two separate sections. First, I examine the dependent variable 
of national voter turnout levels from 1940 to 2000 in regards to the independent variables 
of the time between elections and the number of competitive parties. The time between 
elections was discussed at length in Chapter 2 and the number of competitive parties was 
the focus of Chapter 3. For the purposes of this analysis, voter turnout has been 
calculated by dividing the number of ballots cast by the number of electors that are on the 
list (registered voters). The time between elections is rather self-explanatory and is 
measured in months for this analysis. The number of competitive parties has been 
calculated using vote shares in the LT index that was described in detail in Chapter 3 and 
the Appendix. I hypothesize that both of the independent variables will have an inverse 
relationship with voter turnout. In other words, as the number of competitive parties and 
the time between elections increase, voter turnout will decrease. 
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Table 4.1 
Nationwide Turnout in Canadian General Elections: 1940 to 2000 
Year Turnout% 
1940 69.9 
1945 75.3 
1949 73.8 
1953 66.9 
1957 74.0 
1958 79.4 
1962 80.l 
1963 79.2 
1965 74.8 
1968 75.7 
1972 76.7 
1974 71.0 
1979 75.8 
1980 69.3 
1984 75.3 
1988 75.5 
1993 69.6 
1997 67.0 
2000 61.2 
Sources: Munroe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac 
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-
1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
The second part of the analysis involves an in-depth look at the 1997 election. 
Due to the availability of demographic data for each riding, I am able to analyze voter 
turnout for all 301 cases within this election. I have chosen to use a combination of 
variables that represent both institutional and socioeconomic factors that influence 
turnout. Based on the literature and the data that is available, I have chosen variables 
representing the institutional factors including the number of electors in the riding, the 
number of competitive parties, margin of victory and the status of the incumbent. The 
socioeconomic variables included in this study are education, unemployment and income. 
Voter turnout and the number of competitive parties are determined the same as 
described above. Margin of victory is the difference between the percentage of votes 
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received by the winner and the first runner up in each riding. The status of the incumbent 
is a dummy variable representing whether or not the previous office holder was re-
elected. Education is operationalized as the percentage of the population of each riding 
with a university education. Unemployment is the percentage of the workforce who are 
without jobs, and income is operationalized as the average income among residents of 
each riding. The number of electors in each riding is the number of eligible voters. 
Based on the literature, I hypothesize that education and income will have a positive 
relationship with turnout, and the other five variables will have an inverse effect. 
Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation 
Since the 1950's, a large body of literature regarding citizen political activity has 
focused on a behavioral approach to voting and the impact of socioeconomic status 
(SES). The literature has consistently found SES to be an important factor. With their 
ground breaking and standard setting book The American Voter, Campbell et.al. (1960) 
examined American voting behavior in the 1950's, focusing mainly on the 1956 election. 
One of their many findings was the fact that SES and other demographic variables 
impacted party choice among voters. The majority of their work centered on individuals' 
political knowledge (or the lack thereof), which leads to party identification as the 
principle determinant of voter choice. The ignorance and apathy among voters that they 
discovered is a contributing factor to declining voter turnout. Almond and Verba also 
expand this area with their classic work The .. Civic Culture (1963). In this work, they 
studied citizen participation in political activity in the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Italy 
and Mexico. While their study was aimed at a much broader theme, its relevance to this 
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chapter lies in their identification of education and income as comparative variables that 
had a positive relationship with political participation. 
The importance of these particular variables was again highlighted in a cross-
national study by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and a study of participation in the U.S. by 
Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (1993). In their study, Verba, Nie and Kim 
determined that increased levels of SES were a strong indicator of increased levels of 
participation. This was particularly evident in the more industrialized countries in their 
study such as the U.S. and the Netherlands. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie re-
examine the status of SES as a determinant of political participation and find that it is still 
a strong predictor. They also determine that it is becoming increasingly important as the 
gap between those with high and low SES grows and the issues that affect those who do 
not participate get ignored. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) add variables relating 
to resources such as community involvement and free time available to individuals to the 
standard SES model. Nevertheless, they maintain that the traditional variables of 
education and income are the primary factors that influence what resources are available 
to an individual. In particular, they find that a minor increase in income can drastically 
increase one's political participation. 
Education and income are clearly considered to be important variables in the 
study of voting behavior. They are also excellent variables to use in this study because 
there is significant variance in their values across the 301 ridings. I have chosen to also 
include unemployment because it is a further measure of the socioeconomic level of an 
area and there are regions within Canada in which the rate of unemployment is much 
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higher than the national average (See Tables 4.3 and 4.5). While these three variables are 
not a complete picture of SES, they are certainly the foundation of that measure. 
Institutional Variables and Political Participation 
While the socioeconomic approach is primarily an American politics approach, 
institutional analysis is an approach largely found in the field of comparative politics. 
Gray and Caul (2000) determine that an approach that focuses entirely on SES cannot 
completely describe levels of political participation, particularly voter turnout. They 
point out that education and income have been on a steady upward trend over the last half 
century but that voter turnout over the same period has been in decline. They argue that 
institutional variables such as the electoral system and the number of political parties are 
more important variables for comparative analysis of political participation. Studlar 
(2001) also argues for an institutional approach and states that institutional variables such 
.as margin of victory and number of parties should be used in concert with traditional SES 
variables in any attempts to model political participation. He states that since 
participation is shaped by so many different factors, the best way to develop a complete 
picture is through combining the approaches. 
Jackman (1987) finds that the greater the number of political parties that are 
involved in an election, the less likely people are to vote. Jackman and Miller (1995) 
present a cross-national study of voter turnout in the 1980's based on institutional 
variables. Two of the variables that they focus on are of particular relevance to this 
chapter. They find that competitive elections should increase the levels of voter turnout 
(this is represented in this chapter as the margin of victory variable). Similarly to 
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Jackman's (1987) earlier finding, Jackman and Miller (1995) also find that multipartism 
depresses turnout (this is represented by the number of competitive parties variable). 
One other institutional variable that receives a significant amount of discussion in 
the literature is compulsory voting (Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1999). Making 
voting compulsory is certainly a way in which to increase turnout. While this is not 
directly relevant to this study as voting has never been compulsory in Canada, there is a 
related issue that is relevant. Prior the 2000 election, it was the responsibility of the 
government to register all eligible voters. Pammett and Vickers (2001) posited that the 
removal of this feature from Canadian politics is the primary cause for the significant 
decline in voter turnout from the 1997 to the 2000 election (see Table 4.1). This will 
certainly become a variable of greater importance if similar results continue to be seen in 
future elections. At this time, it is too early to make a judgment on the impact that the 
elimination of compulsory registration has had on voter turnout. 
Data and Methodology 
The sources of the data for voter turnout, time between elections, number of 
competitive parties, number of electors, margin of victory and the status of the incumbent 
are all from the government and have been used in Chapters 2 and 3. The variables of 
education, unemployment and income were obtained from the Federal Electoral District 
Profiles generated by the government agency Statistics Canada and are based on the 1996 
census. 
Voter turnout is reported as a percentage in each of these sources. A description 
of the method used to calculate the number of competitive parties can be found in 
Chapter 3 and the Appendix. Margin of victory and the time between elections are both 
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subtraction calculations. The incumbent is identified for each of the ridings in the Thirty-
Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis, and then I coded the 
variable 1 if they won and 0 if they were defeated. Unemployment is reported as a 
percentage, and income is reported in Canadian dollars as an average of the income of 
residents over the age of fifteen. Education is calculated by dividing the number of 
residents with a university education by the number of residents over the age of fifteen. 
One strength of this data set is that there are nineteen cases for the first analysis 
and 301 for the second which creates a good sample size. There are enough cases to be 
able to assume with confidence that any observed trends are not anomalies. Another 
strength of this data is that it represents a combination of the institutional and the 
socioeconomic approaches that will hopefully create a more complete picture than either 
approach would be able to do on its own. One weakness, already discussed in Chapter 3, 
is the accuracy of the LT index in determining the number of competitive parties. 
However, I still believe that this index is the best measure available to determine the 
number of parties competing in a single election in a single district. Another weakness is 
that for the socioeconomic data, the numbers are based on the population over the age of 
fifteen which is below the voting age. Therefore, citizens who cannot contribute to the 
voter turnout are influencing the measures of some of the independent variables. This is 
an unfortunate element of the way that the census data was compiled, but it is unlikely to 
have a major impact on the outcome of my analysis. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I will use linear regression as the form of 
statistical analysis. Regression is the most appropriate method because all of the 
variables are ratio measures, with the exception of the single dummy variable for 
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incumbency, and this is the method that provides the most powerful analysis with 
multiple independent variables at this level of measurement. 
Longitudinal National Turnout 
The first analysis that I performed was with the dependent variable of national 
voter turnout for the years of 1940 to 2000. The independent variables for this analysis 
were the time between elections and the number of competitive parties in each election. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.2. The R2 value of .069 shows that these 
independent variables do not explain the variance in voter turnout. Table 4.2 shows that 
the number of competitive parties has a statistically significant relationship with voter 
turnout (at the .10 level) and that that relationship is in the expected direction. As I 
predicted, voter turnout decreases as the number of competitive parties increases. 
However, the model has very little explanatory ability. The time between elections did 
not tum out to be statistically significant. 
Table 4.2 
Regression Analysis: Nationwide Turnout in Canadian General Elections: 1940 to 2000 
Dependent Variable - Voter Turnout 
Notes: 
* p < .10 
Time Between Elections 1 
Number of Competitive Parties 
Adjusted R2 = .069 
N = 19 
1 Time between elections is measured in months. 
Standardized 
Beta 
.016 
-.420* 
Sources: Mumoe Eagles, James P. Bickerton, Alain G. Gagnon, and Patrick J. Smith. 1995. The Almanac 
of Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press., Frank Feigert. 1989. Canada Votes 1935-
1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press., Thirty-Seventh General Election 2000 Official Voting Results 
Synopsis. 2001. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada., Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 
Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. 
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Part of the reason for the low R2 value is that there were only two independent 
variables, and they both represented institutional factors. As the literature discussed 
above suggests, electoral participation is influenced by many factors both institutional 
and socioeconomic. The finding regarding the influence of the number of competitive 
parties is important and will be discussed in further detail below with the analysis of the 
1997 election. As that analysis also includes socioeconomic data, it will address the issue 
of turnout combining the two approaches for a hopefully more complete picture. 
Turnout in the 1997 General Election 
As with the above analysis, the R2 value shown in Table 4.3 is not overly 
impressive at .101. Table 4.3 also shows that five of the seven independent variables had 
the anticipated sign. The number of competitive parties, margin of victory, 
unemployment and the re-election of an incumbent were all inversely related to turnout, 
and education was shown to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. 
The number of electors had a positive relationship, and income an inverse relationship 
with turnout, both of which were unanticipated results. Table 4.3 shows that the number 
of electors, the number of competitive parties, margin of victory and education were the 
only independent variables to have a statistically significant relationship with voter 
turnout. 
Once again, this demonstrates that there is a substantial number of variables that 
contribute to determining voter turnout. I included a range of independent variables that 
covered both socioeconomic and institutional factors, yet there is still a significant lack of 
explanatory ability from the model that I developed. A possible alternate theory is that 
my analysis is too broad. Different variables may have a different impact in various 
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regions which could create problems when an aggregate analysis is conducted. For this 
reason, I present a follow-up analysis by breaking the data into regional groupings. 
Table 4.3 
Regression Analysis: Nationwide Turnout in the 1997 Canadian General Election 
Notes: 
** p < .05 
* p < .01 
Dependent Variable - Voter Turnout 
Number of Electors 
Number of Competitive Parties 
Margin of Victory 
Education 
Unemployment 
Income 
Incumbent 
Standardized 
Beta 
.139** 
-.325* 
-.398* 
.255* 
-.068 
-.122 
-.024 
Adjusted R2 = .101 
N = 301 
1 The incumbent was re-elected in 70. l % of the ridings (211 out of 301). 
Mean 
65,327 
2.89 
20.8 
22.2 
10.6 
24,813 
70.1 1 
Sources: Thirty-Sixth General Election 1997 Official Voting Results Synopsis. 1997. Ottawa: The Chief 
Electoral Officer of Canada., Statistics Canada Website <www.statcan.ca>. 
Regional Analysis of Turnout in the 1997 Election 
For this section of this chapter, I have divided Canada into five commonly used 
regional groupings: The Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia. 
The Maritimes include the provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, 
and Prince Edward Island, and the Prairies are made up of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta (See Figure 1.1). Table 4.4 shows the results for these five separate analyses, and 
Table 4.5 shows the mean values for each of the variables in each region. As Table 4.4 
illustrates, no two regions have the same results. Only Quebec and British Columbia 
have the same sign for all of the variables, but they differ in magnitude and statistical 
significance. 
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A closer look at Table 4.4 reveals that only the variables of education and 
unemployment maintain the same sign across all five regions. In each case, education 
shows a positive relationship, and unemployment is inversely related to voter turnout 
(both of which were the expected directions). The case of Quebec stands out in that five 
of the seven variables have statistically significant relationships with turnout, and of 
those five, only income did not show the expected sign. It is also interesting to note that 
in each of the five regions the R2 values are significantly more robust than they were for 
the aggregated national model. The R2 value for the Prairie Provinces (.625) is 
particularly significant. 
A few more interesting results become apparent when Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 are 
compared against each other, particularly concerning the unemployment and income 
variables. As Table 4.4 shows, the unemployment variable is statistically significant in 
the Maritimes, Quebec and the Prairies. As shown in Table 4.5 the Maritimes and Quebec 
are the regions with the two highest unemployment rates, and the Prairies have the lowest 
unemployment. Another similar observation exists when examining the income variable. 
The Maritimes and Quebec are the only two regions in which income is a statistically 
significant predictor of turnout as Table 4.4 shows. At the same time, by looking at 
Tables 4.5 and 4.3, it can be seen that these two regions are also the only ones in which 
the average income is lower than the national average. 
Table 4.5 displays some very interesting statistics. The Maritimes and Quebec 
register the highest voter turnout, yet contrary to the hypotheses, they have the lowest 
levels of education, highest unemployment and the lowest average income. In holding 
strongly with the hypothesis that lower margins of victory will produce increased turnout, 
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these two regions also have the lowest numbers for this variable. However, Table 4.4 
shows that margin of victory is not statistically significant in the case of the Maritimes, 
and it also has a positive sign. 
Conclusion 
The most important findings of this chapter have to do with the impact of the 
number of competitive parties and the margin of victory on voter turnout levels. In both 
the longitudinal national analysis and the analysis of the 1997 election, the number of 
competitive parties was found to be inversely related to turnout and statistically 
significant. It is understandable that this result may seem counterintuitive. It seems 
logical that with more competitive parties participating, it is easier for a voter to find one 
that approximates their viewpoint therefore encouraging voter participation. However, 
the greater the number of competitive parties, the more work is required of the voter in 
order to make a strategic choice. If there are only two parties for voters to choose from, 
then they are not required to do much research, and therefore participation is relatively 
easy. The more parties that contest an election, the harder it is to keep abreast of all of 
their positions and their relative strength. 
It should come as no surprise that voter turnout decreases as the margin of victory 
increases. If the race is not expected to be close, then there is less of an incentive for 
voters to participate and for parties to campaign. This also exposes a possible flaw with 
using voter turnout as a measure of citizen participation and involvement in the political 
arena. With large margins of victory, one would have to assume that the non-voters 
would be drastically disproportionate supporters of the second place candidate in order to 
think that increased voter turnout would impact outcomes. If there is no doubt in the 
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outcome, then there is little risk undertaken by supporters of the predicted victor if they 
choose to stay home, and there is also little incentive for supporters of predicted losers in 
this scenario to inconvenience themselves by voting. 
As was anticipated, and strongly supported by the literature, education was 
positively associated with turnout at a statistically significant level. As this is an almost 
universally accepted generalization about political participation, I will not take up space 
discussing it here. Income is also widely talked about in the literature as being positively 
associated with participation, and this analysis does not bear that out. Even though the 
results were not statistically significant at the national level, they did indicate an inverse 
relationship. In the two regions in which it was a statistically significant predictor, the 
inverse relationship was also indicated. 
On the national level, the results indicate that neither of these models are very 
robust predictors of voter turnout. I have mentioned two possible explanations for this 
above. First of all, it is certainly possible that both of the models are far too simple and 
do not take into account enough variables. This is clearly the case in the longitudinal 
model as it includes no socioeconomic measures whatsoever. A second problem that is 
clearly seen with the analysis of the 1997 election is the effect that aggregation has on the 
model. When the data was disaggregated into five separate regions, the models were 
noticeably more robust. The strongest indication that aggregation has created a problem 
in this instance is that there is clearly variance in both the sign and significance levels of 
the independent variables across the regions. This indicates that there are probably other 
variables that must be controlled for before attempting to analyze voter turnout across a 
widely diverse population. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
Introduction 
This thesis has covered three important topics in the field of political science and 
has analyzed them using primarily an institutional approach. This work has served to 
strengthen the contention that electoral system design has a profound effect on party 
system development and both party and voter behavior. This concluding chapter will 
highlight the findings of the previous chapters, some of the problems and weaknesses 
with this research and suggest areas for future research. 
Election Timing 
The analysis of the impact of the timing of elections on the party in government 
that was presented in Chapter 2 had three hypotheses, one relating to each of the three 
reasons for calling an election. The first hypothesis stated that if the government waits 
the maximum time allowable before calling an election the government party will lose 
seats or at best maintain their seat share. My preliminary findings indicated that this 
hypothesis has merit. After a re-operationalization of the cut-off for determining if an 
election was called early or went the full term the government party lost seats in eight of 
the ten instances in which it used the maximum time allowable. 
The second hypothesis involved early elections called by the government and 
stated that in this scenario the government party would increase its seat share. Based on 
my preliminary findings, this hypothesis also seemed to be correct, but the findings 
demonstrated how susceptible this analysis is to the operationalization of the variables. 
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Shifting the time limit on early elections from nine months to a full year had a substantial 
effect on the outcome. Before the reclassification, five out of ten cases that were 
identified as early election calls saw the government party gain seats. After the 
reclassification, the government party gained seats in four out of six elections. I will deal 
with these operationalization and methodological issues in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
Finally, the third hypothesis stated that if an election is forced by a no-confidence 
vote in the parliament, then the government party will lose seats. There were only three 
cases in which this occurred so it is impossible to come to any significant conclusions 
regarding this hypothesis. This is a problem that exists with all three hypotheses. A 
larger sample size would be necessary in order to make conclusions regarding Canada or 
any larger generalizations to parliamentary regimes as a whole. The issues of sample size 
and susceptibility to operationalization limit the explanatory power of the analysis in this 
chapter. While these results show that future research in this area is warranted, these 
problems must be addressed in order to enhance these initial findings. 
The primary contribution of Chapter 2 was to demonstrate that the timing of 
elections is an important area of study in parliamentary regimes. This is in contrast to the 
majority of literature on the timing of elections which focuses on presidential regimes. 
This analysis shows that there are some similarities between the two regime types when it 
comes to the timing of elections and that since parliamentary governments have some 
control over this feature, they have a unique way in which they can influence outcomes 
that is not present in presidential regimes. 
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Canadian Exceptionalism to Duverger's Law 
The hypothesis in Chapter 3 stated that multipartism is evident at both the 
national and riding level in Canadian elections. This hypothesis is tested using the same 
LT index method as Gaines (1999). Using this method, the results for the 1997 and the 
2000 election confirm the pattern established by Gaines for the elections from 1935 
through 1993. While this analysis shows that Canada is an exception to Duverger's law, 
and is not characterized by two-party competition at either the riding or national level, a 
small change in the method presents a drastically different picture. 
By using seat shares instead of vote shares in the LT index, I find that Canadian 
elections at the riding level are more appropriately characterized as two-party or even 
one-party competition. This finding, which is the most significant contribution of this 
chapter, concurs with Duverger's (1964) hypothesis that Canadian exceptionalism at the 
national level is the result of different regional parties competing with national parties in 
different regions of the country. As with the problem regarding the time limit for 
declaring an election an early call in Chapter 2, this points out the sensitivity of many of 
these variables to their operationalization. 
Voter Turnout 
The analysis of voter turnout presented in Chapter 4 used a combination of 
behavioral and institutional approaches. The longitudinal analysis, which focused solely 
on institutional variables, explored the hypothesis that both the number of competitive 
parties (determined using vote shares in the LT index) and the time between elections 
would be inversely related to voter turnout. Only the number of competitive parties was 
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found to be a statistically significant determinant of voter turnout and that relationship 
was in the expected direction. 
The analysis of voter turnout in the 1997 election involved seven independent 
variables. The institutional variables of the number of electors, the number of 
competitive parties, margin of victory and re-election of the incumbent as well as the 
socioeconomic variable of unemployment were all hypothesized to have an inverse 
relationship with voter turnout. The socioeconomic variables of education and income 
were hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. At the 
national level, the independent variables of the number of competitive parties, margin of 
victory and education were all significant at the .01 level and had the anticipated signs. 
The number of electors was significant at the .05 level, but the relationship was not in the 
hypothesized direction. Unemployment, income and re-election of the incumbent were 
all inversely related to turnout (which was unexpected in the case of income); however, 
none of the three were statistically significant. The R2 value of .101 was not very robust 
which indicated that these variables do not do a very good job of predicting voter turnout. 
Chapter 4 also presented a regional analysis of the 1997 election which generated 
some very different results. Not only were the R2 values much more robust than in the 
aggregate analysis, but there was also substantial fluctuation between regions as to which 
independent variables were significant. In fact, unemployment and education were the 
only independent variables that maintained the same sign across all five regions. This 
drastic difference between the regional and aggregate analysis is the major contribution 
of this chapter. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
Now that these conclusions have been reached the question is where do we go 
from here? The most obvious expansion of this research would involve an increase in the 
sample sizes. In the case of the election timing analysis from Chapter 2, this would most 
likely involve the implementation of a cross-national study. There are several other 
parliamentary regimes that could be included in order to extend the preliminary findings 
that are presented here. 
The analysis of Canadian exceptionalism to Du verger's law would benefit from 
an extension of the seat share data to include all of the elections that were part of the vote 
share analysis done in Chapter 3. The addition of this longitudinal data would either 
enhance my findings or demonstrate that the 1997 and 2000 elections are exhibiting a 
new trend with the presence of the CAP in the west and the BQ in Quebec bringing an 
increased regional nature to Canadian elections. The additional seat share data would 
show whether or not there have been regionally based parties contributing to Canada's 
multipartism throughout the entire 1935 to 2000 period or that this is a new feature found 
only with the recent emergence of the CAP and BQ. This data would also help to 
determine whether seat shares or vote shares should be used in the LT index calculation 
by significantly increasing the sample size. 
The voter turnout analysis in Chapter 4 would also benefit from a larger sample 
size and greater longitudinal data. Unfortunately, the census does not always correspond 
with an election year which makes accurate socioeconomic data difficult to come by. 
The demonstration that there is a drastic divergence between the regional and the 
aggregate analysis leads to many possibilities for future research. This finding certainly 
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calls into question the accuracy of any aggregate analysis in which there are substantial 
differences between the regions. By narrowing the scope of the analysis, the number of 
intervening variables that need to be controlled for decreases. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that institutional variables play a critical role in party 
system development and government formation as well as impacting voting behavior. It 
has also demonstrated that some of these variables are highly sensitive to 
operationalization and that a consensus needs to be reached in order to avoid problems of 
measurement. This is especially true in areas such as the timing of elections in 
parliamentary regimes because there is so little literature that focuses on this topic. Since 
there is no literature on the impact that the timing of elections has on the seat share of the 
party in government in parliamentary regimes, there was nothing to guide me in the 
operationalization of the variables relating to that analysis. As more longitudinal and 
cross-national studies are done in these areas, there will be a process of standardization in 
the operationalization of these variables which will help to develop some consistency and 
allow for broader generalizations to be made. 
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Appendix 
An Explanation of the LT Index with an Example 
LT Index 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a method for measuring the number of 
effective parties in elections (or assemblies) that is based on their relative size rather than 
a strict counting of those receiving votes (or seats) or developing a threshold point (i.e., 
receiving greater than 10%). The LT index is: N = ( LPi2 r1: 
N = the number of competitive parties. 
Pi= the vote share (or seat share) of the ith party. 
Example of the Calgary East Riding in the 1997 Election 
Five parties received votes in this riding. The RP received 45%, the PC 24.6%, 
the LP 22.8%, the NDP 6.5% and the Natural Law Party received 1.1 %. The first step in 
the LT index calculation is to tum these percentages into decimals so they can be used in 
the equation. We now have .45, .246, .228, .065 and .011 as the vote share values for p1 
through p5 respectively. N equals one divided by the sum of the squares of these values: 
N = 1 I ((p1)2 + (p2)2 + (p3)2 + (p4)2 + (ps)2) 
N = 1 I ((.45)2 + (.246)2 + (.228)2 + (.065)2 + (.011)2) 
N = 1 I ( .2025 + .060516 + .051984 + .004225 + .000121) 
N = 1 I .319346 
N= 3.13 
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